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Abstract
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolu-
tionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals
is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation
and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the
transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established at
equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and their
evolutionary stability.
1 Introduction and Previous Work
The object of game theory is the analysis of situations where the different social actors
have conflicting requirements and individual decisions will have a mutual influence on
each other[1]. In this framework, and due to their importance as simplified models of
many common important socio-economic situations, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and
the Snowdrift (SD) games have received much attention in the literature. According to
game theory, the PD and the SD are paradigmatic examples of games in which coopera-
tive attitude should vanish in the PD, and should be limited to a given fraction in the SD.
This is also the case when large populations of individuals play the game pairwise in
a random manner and anonimously, as prescribed by evolutionary game theory [2]. In
spite of this, numerical simulations of the PD have convincingly shown that, when the
population of players possesses a spatial structure, a certain amount of cooperation can
emerge and remain stable. Nowak and May [3] were the first to empirically show this
using a population structured as a square lattice where each site is a player. Standard
evolutionary game theory is based on an infinite (or very large) population model, and
on the random pairing of two players at each time step. This amounts to a mean-field
spatially homogeneous model. The square grid is also spatially homogeneous but the
absence of random mixing enables the formation of clusters of cooperators, which al-
lows for more frequent positive encounters between cooperators than would be possible
in the mean-field case. More recently, it has become apparent that many real networks
are neither regular nor random graphs; instead, they have short diameters, like random
graphs, but much higher clustering coefficients than the latter, i.e. they have more local
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structure. These networks are collectively called small-world networks (see [4] for a
recent review). Many technological, social, and biological networks are now known to
be of this kind. Social networks, in addition, show recognizable community structure
[5, 6]. Since evolutionary PD or SD games are metaphors for conflicting social in-
teractions, the research attention has recently shifted from random graphs and regular
lattices towards better models of social interaction structures [7, 8, 9, 10].
Recently, Santos and Pacheco [9] presented a numerical study of the evolution
of cooperation on (static) scale-free (SF) networks for the PD and the SD games.
Their main result was that, in contrast with what one observes in mixing populations
or on regular lattices, much higher levels of cooperation are sustainable on this kind
of graphs, both for the PD as well as the SD. These results are obviously interest-
ing and encouraging for cooperation but they prompt a number of questions. First of
all, Bara´basi–Albert or correlationless configuration SF graphs [11] that were used in
[9] are not faithful representations of most typical social networks. In fact, although
social interaction networks where the degree distribution can be well described by a
power-law have been found [12, 13], several recent studies show that social networks
in general do not have a pure power-law degree distribution function, as they often
show signs of exponential decay of the tail of the distribution [14, 15]. In addition,
they usually have more clustering than pure scale-free graphs [4]. Nevertheless, model
SF networks are a useful bounding case to study as they are closer to typical social net-
works than other more artificial kind of graphs, such as Watts–Strogatz small worlds
[16]. A second aspect of social networks that is not captured by fixed graph struc-
tures is that they are not static; rather, the number of vertices and the links between
them continuously evolve as social actors come and go, and relationships are created
or abandoned. Dynamical features such as these have been introduced in evolutionary
games, among others, in [17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. However, in this paper we only focus on
the static aspects of the interaction networks. In other words, we make the hypothesis
that the network is at equilibrium and that network dynamics are either absent, or their
time scale is longer (slower) with respect to the strategy-change dynamics. This proves
to be a useful approach, especially for social acquaintance networks.
In the following we present a brief introduction to the games studied. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the population model and of individual’s payoff calculation
scheme for the players in a complex network. Next we describe the numerical simu-
lations and their results, including a study of evolutionary stability. We finally present
our conclusions.
2 Two Social Dilemmas
Let us first recall a few elementary notions on the PD and the SD. These are two-person,
symmetric games in which each player has two possible strategies: cooperate (C) or
defect (D). In strategic form, also known as normal form, these games have the payoff
bi-matrix of table 1. In this matrix, R stands for the reward the two players receive if
they both cooperate, P is the punishment for bilateral defection, and T is the temptation,
i.e. the payoff that a player receives if it defects, while the other cooperates. In this
latter case, the cooperator gets the sucker’s payoff S. For the PD, the payoff values are
2
C D
C (R,R) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
Table 1: Payoff matrix for a standard two-person, two-strategies game (see text).
ordered numerically in the following way: T > R > P > S, while in the SD game
T > R > S > P . Defection is always the best rational individual choice in the PD –
(D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium and also an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).
Mutual cooperation would be preferable but it is a strongly dominated strategy. Thus
the dilemma is caused by the “selfishness” of the actors.
In the SD, when both players defect they each get the lowest payoff; (C,D) and
(D,C) are Nash equilibria of the game in pure strategies, and there is a third equilibrium
in mixed strategies where strategy D is played with probability 1/(2β−1), and strategy
C with probability 1− 1/(2β− 1), where β is another name for the temptation T , used
in biological circles. The dilemma in this game is caused by “greed”, i.e. players have
a strong incentive to “bully” their opponent by playing D, which is harmful for both
parties if the outcome produced is (D,D).
3 Numerical Simulations
The two games were simulated in [9] on Baraba´si-Albert (BA) [11] and configuration
model [4] scale-free networks of size 104 over 104 time steps, using a discrete analogue
of replicator dynamics equations [2, 22]. The customary rescaling of the payoff values
was used such that there is only one independent parameter. For the PD, setting R = 1,
P = S = 0, leaves T = b > 1 to be the only parameter (temptation). For the SD,
T is set equal to β > 1, R = β − 1/2, S = β − 1, and P = 0, which makes the
cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation r = 1/(2β − 1) the only parameter. For
the sake of comparison, our simulations were done under the same conditions as in [9]
(104 players and 104 time steps).
However, replicator dynamics is not the only possibility for updating the agents’
strategies in discrete, finite populations of players using hard-wired strategies. More-
over, in small non degree-homogeneous populations, the mathematical requirements
behind the replicator dynamics, strictly speaking, are not satisfied [23]. Thus, we ex-
tended the investigation by simulating an imitate the best evolution rule according to
which an individual i will adopt the strategy of the player with the highest payoff
among its neighbors and itself. If a tie occurs, the winner is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom between the best. This rule is deterministic and was the original rule used in [3].
Concerning the calculation of an individual’s payoff, there are several possibilities.
A player’s payoff may be defined as the sum (accumulated payoff ) of all pair interac-
tions with its nearest neighbors, which is the form used for instance in [9]. Another
possibility consists in using average payoff, which is the accumulated payoff divided
by the number of interactions. Accumulated and average payoff give the same results
when considering degree-homogenous networks such as lattices. Accumulated payoff
3
seems more logical in degree-heterogeneous networks such as scale-free graphs since
it reflects the very fact that players may have different numbers of neighbors in the net-
work. Average payoff, on the other hand, smooths out the possible differences although
it might be justified in terms of number of interactions that a player may sustain in a
given time. For instance, an individual with many connections is likely to interact less
often with each of its neighbors than another that has a lower number of connections.
Also, if there is a cost to maintain a relationship, average payoff will roughly cap-
ture this fact, while it will be hidden if one uses accumulated payoff. For the sake of
comparing the two extreme views, here we use both accumulated and average payoff.
Under discrete replicator dynamics rule with accumulated payoff, and using syn-
chronous update, Santos and Pacheco [9] found that, when compared to regular lattices,
SF networks lead to high levels of cooperation for all values of the parameters b (for
PD) and r (for SD). These results have been reproduced by us and are shown in the
upper half of figure 1. Cooperation is also much higher in SF graphs than what has
been obtained for Watts–Strogatz small-world graphs [7, 10]. When using the “imi-
tation of the best” strategy-switching rule with synchronous update and accumulated
payoff the results are similar, as one can see in the lower part of figure 1, although
there is a marked fall in the high-b and high-r region with respect to replicator dynam-
ics. However, when one lingers on the standard deviations (represented as error bars
in the figure), one sees that the results for the imitate the best rule are noisy, with quite
large fluctuations. Deviations are smaller for the replicator dynamics, see figure 1. The
reason for the instability and the large fluctuations can be traced to the step function na-
ture of the update rule, as can be seen in figure 3 (a), in which 40 individual PD runs are
plotted, all with b = 1.8. In all runs cooperation falls at the beginning, the cooperators
then often recover but not always, as there are several runs (about 1/5 for the data used
here) in which cooperation never recovers. On the other hand, when using replicator
dynamics, there is still a systematic drop of cooperation at the beginning (figure 3 (c)),
nevertheless it tends to rise again in the long run, although this may happen very late in
the simulation (see figure 3 (b)). To better observe this phenomenon, we have doubled
the number of time steps (2× 104).
We thus see that the results on BA SF graphs depend on the update rule, although
the level of cooperation is still higher than what is found on regular, Watts–Strogatz,
and random graphs [22, 10]. However, we wish to point out that if we use an asyn-
chronous update policy 1 with the “imitate the best” rule instead of the usual syn-
chronous one, the result is a higher level of cooperation with far less fluctuations than
the synchronous case (compare lower parts of figures 1 and 2). One might reason that
the combination of synchronous update and of “imitate the best” is fully determinis-
tic, which implies that particular chains of events, such as cascades of defection, will
be amplified. Introducing stochasticity through asynchrony in the update sequence
strongly mitigates the likelihood of such series of events. On the other hand, when
using replicator dynamics, the lack of stochasticity in synchronous update is some-
how compensated for by the probabilistic strategy change rule, which could explain
the similarity of the results in this latter case (compare the upper parts of figures 1 and
1We use the standard uniform random choice (with replacement) of players in the population, which is a
discrete approximation of a Poisson process.
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Figure 1: Fraction of cooperators on SF BA networks of size 104 and average degree
k¯ = 4 with accumulated payoff and synchronous dynamics. Mean values over 50 runs.
Upper figures: replicator dynamics; lower figures: imitation of the best.
2 respectively).
To illustrate the influence of timing when “imitate the best” is the rule used for
strategy update, suppose that a defector occupies the most highly connected node in
the graph and that it is surrounded by cooperators exclusively. Then, at the next time
step in synchronous update, all those cooperators will turn into defectors. From there,
a wave of defection could quickly propagate through the network, leading to a state
whereby cooperation cannot be recovered. On the other hand, when players are up-
dated in random order, only a fraction of the neighbors will imitate the defector, at the
same time lowering the payoff of the central defector, and thus making it less attrac-
tive to be imitated in future encounters. This kind of process limits the propagation
of defection and allows cooperation to establish itself and be stable. This highlights
some shortcomings of synchronous dynamics, which is unrealistic and may give rise
to spurious effects [24]. Our conclusion is that, although there is often no significant
difference between synchronous and asynchronous update in evolutionary games, as it
is the case here under replicator dynamics, the latter is to be preferred for reasons of
generality and reliability. However, for the sake of comparison with previous results,
in the rest of the paper we use synchronous update.
Now we turn our attention to the assumption that a player’s utility is the sum,
i.e. the accumulated payoff of all pair interactions with its nearest neighbors. Al-
though this appears to be a logical step to follow, we shall show that it may cause
5
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Figure 2: Fraction of cooperators on SF BA networks of size 104 and average degree
k¯ = 4 with accumulated payoff and asynchronous dynamics. Mean values over 50
runs. Upper figures: replicator dynamics; lower figures: imitation of the best.
both conceptual and technical problems. Obviously, one would assume that if an in-
dividual has more links to cooperators, and that the payoffs are positive quantities,
she should earn more than another player with fewer cooperating neighbors. How-
ever, this begs the question of how the network got there in the first place. BA SF
graphs are incrementally built by using linear preferential attachment [11]. In this
model there is no cost associated to the formation of a new link. However, although
this model may be adequate for citation networks or, to some extent, the Web, it is
well known that this cannot be the case in most other instances. Thus, other models
have been proposed that take into account cost and other factors in network forma-
tion [4]. In our case, it is as if the population would be “injected” on an already
full-grown, topology-favorable network, while the rules of the game and other con-
siderations necessarily should play a role in the network formation and dynamics. The
same remarks also hold for the “configuration” SF graphs, although these networks
are built starting from the degree distribution and a fixed number of nodes, rather than
incrementally. Furthermore, a technical problem arises when combining replicator dy-
namics with accumulated payoff. In infinite mixing populations, classical evolutionary
game theory states that replicator dynamics is invariant under positive affine transfor-
mations of payoffs with merely a possible change of time scale [2]. This invariance
still holds in finite degree-homogenous populations. However, when different indi-
viduals start having different degrees, things are not quite the same. Let Πi denote
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Figure 3: PD time series with b = 1.8; (a) imitation of the best; (b) replicator dynamics;
(c) replicator dynamics (first 70 steps).
a player i’s aggregated payoff. Furthermore, let φ(Πj − Πi) = (Πj − Πi)/(Dk>)
be the probability function according to which i adopts neighbor j’s strategy, with
D = max{T,R, P, S} −min{T,R, P, S} and k> = max{ki, kj}, where kx repre-
sents the degree of player x [9]. If we now apply a positive affine transformation of
the payoff matrix, this leads to the new aggregated payoff Π′i = αΠi + βki and hence
φ(Π′j−Π
′
i) = (αΠj+βkj−αΠi−βki)/(αDk>) = φ(Πj−Πi)+(kj−ki)/(αDk>).
One can clearly see that using accumulated payoff does not lead to an invariance of the
replicator dynamics under shifts of the payoff matrix. As an illustration of the violation
of this invariance, figure 4 shows cooperation curves for the PD when applying such
payoff transformations.
This has several implications such as limiting the results obtained in [9] strictly to
the studied values of b and r, and to an impossibility to rescale the payoff matrix. In a
more recent study [25] Santos et al. investigated the same games in a wider parameter
space, but still using accumulated payoff, which again makes the results non-invariant
with respect to a positive affine transformation. Therefore, we repeated the numerical
simulations with average payoff, i.e. the aggregated payoff obtained by one player
divided by the number of links the player has to nearest neighbors, which, along with
the shortcomings described above, has the advantage of leaving the replicator dynamics
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Figure 5: Fraction of cooperators on SF BA networks of size 104 with average degree
k¯ = 4 using average payoff and synchronous dynamics. Mean values over 50 runs.
Upper figures: replicator dynamics; lower figures: imitation of the best.
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invariant under positive affine transformations.
In figure 5 we report results for the PD and SD games using average payoff with
synchronous updating dynamics, and the same parameter set as in [9]. Looking at
the figures, and comparing them with the results of [9] (replicated here for k¯ = 4 in
figure 1), one immediately sees that the cooperation level reached after the transient
equilibration period is much lower, and comparable with the results found for regular
and random graphs. This is reasonable, given that now it is as if each individual had
the same average number of neighbors as far as its payoff is concerned.
To reach a better understanding of the difference between accumulated and average
payoff, we interpolated between the two extreme cases according to the formula
Πi =
1
kd
∑
j
pii,j , (1)
where d ∈ [0, 1], Πi is the net payoff of player i, and pii,j is the payoff player i obtains
when interacting with neighbor j. One can see that, when d = 0 we recover the
accumulated payoff value, while d = 1 corresponds to the average payoff case. Figure
6 clearly shows that, as d varies from 0 to 1, and thus the ratio varies from 1 to 1/k,
cooperation levels steadily decrease for all values of the temptation on the y-axis. So,
the way in which individual payoff is computed has a large influence on cooperation
levels that can be reached, in the average, on a given network topology.
d
te
m
p
ta
ti
o
n
c
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 6: Cooperation level as a function of the parameter d of equation 1 in the PD for
temptation values between 1 and 2. Cooperation prevails in light areas; Darker areas
mean more defection. Results are the average of 50 runs.
4 Evolutionary Stability
Evolutionary stability, i.e. the resistance to invasion by mutant strategies, is an im-
portant issue when dealing with evolutionary games [2]. The effect of switching the
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Figure 7: System stability when using accumulated payoff. For each parameter set, 100
runs have been perturbed, but only a few individual runs are plotted here to expose the
behaviors encountered. Upper figures: replicator dynamics; lower figures: imitation of
the best. Left-hand figures: b = 1.8; right-hand figures: r = 0.5.
strategy of the hub with largest connectivity in a totally cooperating population has
been studied in [26]. Here we use a different approach to perturb the population after
it has reached a quasi-stable state by switching the strategy of a few players having the
strategy of the greater number. This was done for values of b ∈ {1.2, 1.5, 1.8} and
r ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. We then give the system 6000 time steps to attempt to reattain its
initial stable state. For reasons of space, we only plot the results obtained for b = 1.8
and r = 0.5 (see figure 7). Given the scale-free nature of the interaction network, in-
troducing a small amount of random noise does not have any effect on the population
stability. On the other hand, when cooperator hubs switch strategy (one to five in our
study), avalanches of defection can form and propagate through the population. Under
replicator dynamics and when using accumulated payoff, about 1/6 of the PD runs do
not recover the state previously attained at time step 104. This fraction rises to 1/3 for
the SD game. With the imitation of the best rule, 1/10 of the PD and SD runs fail to
recover from the perturbations. In contrast to accumulated payoff, average payoff does
not allow perturbations to generate any noticeable effect, i.e. the system remains quite
stable.
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5 Conclusions
In conclusion, we have deepened and extended the study presented in [9] clarifying
the role of the updating rule and the type of payoff attributed to players. We have
shown that the games are not invariant under linear affine tranformations when us-
ing accumulated payoff, while average payoff does not have this problem, although it
may artificially reduce the impact of scale-free degree networks. We have also seen
that asynchronous update dynamics, being more likely in a system of independently
interacting agents, by eliminating artificial effects due to the nature of synchronous
update, may give rise to steadier quasi-equilibrium states. Moreover, we have studied
several dynamical aspects of the evolution of the populations such as their transients
before attaining the steady-state, and their evolutionary stability, showing that scale-
free networks of interactions provide a quite stable environment for the emergence of
cooperation when using accumulated payoff, except when hubs are targeted by the mu-
tations, in which case a sizable number of runs do not recover the original state, at least
within the simulation times allowed in our numerical experiments.
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